Over the years, modern Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have become widely computerised and connected via the Internet and are, therefore, potentially vulnerable to cyber attacks. Currently there is a lack of vulnerability scanners specialised to ICS settings. Systems such as PLCScan and ModScan output pertinent information from a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC). However, they do not offer any information as to how vulnerable a PLC is to an attack. In this paper, we address these limitations and propose SimaticScan, a vulnerability scanner specialised to Siemens SIMATIC PLCs. Through experimentation in a comprehensive water treatment testbed, we demonstrate SimaticScan's effectiveness in determining a range of vulnerabilities across three distinct PLCs, including a previously unknown vulnerability in one of the PLCs. Our experiments also show that SimaticScan outperforms the widely used Nessus vulnerability scanner (with relevant ICS-specific plugins deployed).
INTRODUCTION
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) were once logically and physical isolated from other business functions. Greater levels of interconnectivity have been achieved via the relatively recent adoption of Information Technology (IT) within what are often referred to as Operational Technology (OT) devices (devices specifically designed to provide monitoring, control, or automation functionalities within a physical process). Hybrid IT/OT interconnectivity provides numerous benefits related to safety, performance, regulatory compliance, cost saving, etc. While such benefits contribute to organisational objectives, additional risks are also introduced; risks not considered in earlier deployments of ICS due to their isolated, closed network design.
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and other connected devices within ICSs are integral to the core design and functionality of many industrial processes. However, the deployment of such devices does not often take into account the means for correct implementation of cybersecurity, as historically ICSs were not designed with security as a core consideration. With cyber attacks on the rise against these systems -the most recent being the targeted power blackout in Ukraine (TrendMicro 2016) -there is an urgent need for tools to establish a better understanding of the vulnerabilities in these systems, across both IT and OT domains.
Existing work, e.g., Project SHINE (Infracritical 2014) , has demonstrated that pertinent information can be harvested from many PLCs -in SHINE's case, by using the SHODAN (Shodan 2016 ) search engine. While such analysis demonstrates that many of these devices are publicly searchable, it does not offer practical insights into how vulnerable the specific devices may be to a cyber attack.
In this paper, we present a specialised vulnerability scanner, SimaticScan, specific to Siemens SIMATIC PLCs. SimaticScan can be used to determine if any PLCs found using the SHODAN search engine are vulnerable to specific attacks by utilising the information retrieved from relevant vulnerability databases. SimaticScan thus addresses the limitations of existing scanners by retrieving fingerprint information of a PLC and comparing it to a database of PLCs that are already known to be vulnerable.
Furthermore, SimaticScan goes beyond simply identifying "potential" vulnerabilities to verifying the existence of these vulnerabilities in the PLC under consideration. Through experimentation in a comprehensive water treatment testbed (Green et al. 2016) , we demonstrate SimaticScan's effectiveness in determining a range of vulnerabilities across three distinct PLCs, including a previously unknown vulnerability in one of the PLCs 1 . Our experiments also show that SimaticScan outperforms the widely used Nessus vulnerability scanner (with relevant ICS-specific plugins deployed).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses existing relevant work in this area. Section 3 presents an overview of SimaticScan and its various stages. Section 4 provides a brief overview of the testbed used for experimentation. Section 5 presents results of the experimentation while Section 6 concludes the paper and identifies directions for future work.
RELATED WORK
This section explores existing works which have either sought to extract critical information from PLCs, or have been designed to identify security vulnerabilities in OT devices specifically.
Two lightweight port scanners, PLCScan (Digital Bond 2016) and ModScan (Bristow 2008) , attempt to enumerate devices across the MODBUS and S7 protocols. The information retrieved from these tools includes slave ID, device name, firmware version, and CPU number. While the firmware version, for example, can be applied to a custom search of a vulnerability database (Toolswatch 2016) in order to identify known associated vulnerabilities, neither tool provides this level of functionality, requiring manual user input, and knowledge of existing databases and their use.
In the IT domain, a number of vulnerability scanning tools are available. Tools such as Nessus, OpenVAS, and Nexpose are all capable of performing vulnerability assessments, and generating comprehensive reports. However, at the time of writing, only Nessus has a function specifically designed for the assessment of OT systems (described as a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition SCADA plug-in). Section 5 presents a comparison of SimaticScan against this plugin.
As our tool is designed with Siemens Simatic PLCs as a core focus, the work of Beresford (2011) -discussing exploitation of Siemens SIMATIC S7 PLCs -is of particular note. In particular, three attacks are discussed:
• Replay Attack allows an attacker to record the incoming and outgoing traffic of a PLC, and use this as a form of authentication by replaying back a payload of packets with the correct previously recorded authentication packet. This vulnerability is achieved due to the plain-text transmission of data within the S7 protocol.
• Reversing Memory Protections which could result in an engineer or operator to be locked out of the PLC.
• Creation of Crafted Packets that can read and write data to the PLC, even dump the memory residing in a PLC.
The work of Beresford (2011) offers practical insight into Siemens PLC vulnerabilities. However, in order to assess against these vulnerabilities, an assessor requires the skills to craft their own packets, alongside knowledge of the Metasploit framework. Within SimaticScan, we build on the exploits described here, but raise the levels of abstraction, allowing an assessor to identify such vulnerabilities without the described skills/knowledge. Figure 1 depicts the logical flow of SimaticScan's operation. The workflow is linear, with calls to third party libraries, including verification of user input when the scanner requires it. Similar to traditional vulnerability scanners, user input is kept to a minimum, ensuring maximum automated operation. The scanner proceeds through the consecutive stages of the program and outputs information based on a target's susceptibility to specific vulnerabilities. Some stages can potentially disrupt the target:
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the SNMP scan, DoS and fuzzing stages are therefore made optional and should be enabled only in controlled test environments where failure is acceptable. The following subsections provide highlevel descriptions of each of the three phases in Figure 1 and the stages within each phase. 
Phase III: Fuzzing
Protocol fuzzing is the process of sending random, or semi-random data to a process (Wang et al. (2013) , Kitagawa et al. (2010) ). In the final stage of the scan, SimaticScan determines if a PLC can be fuzzed, a useful function for determining other vulnerabilities. Fuzzing acts as a vulnerability research tool where the data sent can identify additional vulnerabilities that were not previously discovered. SimaticScan sends random data to the PLC and provides the outputs. Examples of random payloads include:
1. Random strings of ASCII characters.
2. Single-character strings.
3. Blocks of ASCII punctuation characters.
HTML-encoded strings.
SimaticScan does not provide feedback regarding the result of the fuzzing phase: for instance, the operator must check whether the target has crashed and possibly restart it manually. This limitation (also affecting the potentially disruptive SNMP scan and DoS phases) is a an opportunity for future improvements of SimaticScan.
OVERVIEW OF THE TESTBED
Our ICS testbed (Green et al. 2014 (Green et al. , 2016 ) provides a broad range of ICS devices, physically applied, with no simulation. Virtualisation is used in order to allow for greater flexibility and scaling of workstation and server implementation across the system. Nevertheless, the routing of these systems remains under physical network device responsibility.
This use of physical devices -PLCs in particular -and physical network routing provides a high level of credibility to the experiments conducted and discussed throughout section 5. We note that the network architecture of the testbed has been reviewed by industry experts and deemed valid and representative of real-world large scale distributed systems. It should also be noted that, although it is not the focus of the experiments in this particular paper, the testbed also covers the intersection of IT and OT environments.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Three Siemens PLCs in the above testbed were used for evaluation: the S7-1200 (Siemens 2016b), S7-300 (Siemens 2016c) , and ET200S (Siemens 2016a) . The following subsections discuss the vulnerabilities discovered through the use of SimaticScan. In addition to SimaticScan, Nessus and its associated SCADA plug-in were also deployedcf. Security (2015) . This allowed for a comparison of SimaticScan's effectiveness with an existing commercial vulnerability scanner. Finally, SimaticScan was also run against a SCADA honeypot: Conpot (2016).
SimaticScan deployment over the testbed
The results of scanning the three PLCs, i.e., the S7-1200, the S7-300 and the ET 200SP, with SimaticScan are shown in Figure 2 . The comments in the figure summarise any discovered vulnerabilities, or suggestions as to why a vulnerability was not found, e.g., a known patch had been applied.
It can be seen that the S7-1200 was vulnerable to 8 categories of vulnerabilities. A high number of CVEs were returned, alongside the web interface vulnerability. Protocol fuzzing yielded no additional vulnerabilities. When performing an SNMP scan, the SNMP network was not enabled for the S7-1200. Therefore, any potential pivot points in the network were not returned. The session ID vulnerability has been patched by Siemens in firmware 2.0. As the firmware of this PLC was 3.0.2, no plaintext session IDs could be found.
The S7-300 was vulnerable to only one CVE. This vulnerability (CVE-2015 (CVE- -2177 ) is a denial of service vulnerability, and differs from the S7-1200 CVEs, as it affects the entire range of S7-300 PLCs, regardless of the firmware version. Again, the session ID vulnerability was patched, and the web interface was not configured, therefore no web server vulnerabilities were identified. The SNMP scan found potential pivot points including the engineering workstation, and another PLC located on the same subnet. Protocol fuzzing yielded no additional vulnerabilities.
The ET 200SP forms part of Siemens' more recent/modern range of PLCs. Because of this, no CPE or CVE information could be found in the vFeed database. Research from other resources, such as Siemens Product Advisory, also found no publicly known vulnerabilities. The SNMP scan returned potential pivot points of the engineering workstation, another PLC, and a CCTV camera, all operating on the subnet. The session ID was not found, and the web interface was not configured, therefore no web server vulnerabilities were identified
Previously unknown vulnerability of ET 200SP.
Phase III of SimaticScan -protocol fuzzing -caused a denial of service on the ET200S, with only a small quantity of packets sent. This DoS vulnerability was not witnessed across the older S7-1200 and S7-300 PLCs. In accordance with the principles of responsible disclosure, we do not provide additional details regarding the exact vulnerability. Contact has been established with Siemens to study the vulnerability in more detail.
Comparing SimaticScan and Nessus
As discussed earlier, vulnerability scanners such as Nexpose and OpenVAS contain no plugins or procedures for checking the vulnerabilities of a PLC. Of the mainstream vulnerability scanners, only Nessus offers such functionality (Security (2015) ). Therefore, we contrast the output of SimaticScan and Nessus.
There exist a total of 61 SCADA plugins that Nessus uses when scanning for vulnerabilities in an ICS. As SimaticScan is concerned with the Siemens range of PLCs, other SCADA plugins for vendors, such as those from Schneider and Rockwell are disregarded.
Nessus uses the following plugins when performing a vulnerability scan of Siemens PLC devices:
• Siemens SIMATIC S7-1200 PLC Web Server Detection
• Siemens SIMATIC S7-1200 PLC < 4.1 Open Redirection
• Siemens SIMATIC S7-1200 PLC Firmware Detection
• Siemens SIMATIC S7-1200 PLC < 4.1.3 XSRF These plugins are only associated with the Siemens S7-1200 PLC, hence we had no expectation to find vulnerabilities associated with the S7-300 and the ET 200SP. Figure 3 shows the vulnerabilities reported by Nessus for the S7-1200. It can be seen that the only information that Nessus was able to retrieve was the PLC Firmware Detection. This plugin of Nessus did not actually return the firmware version number used to check if it is vulnerable according to any CVEs like SimaticScan does. Nor did it return the other vulnerabilities that SimaticScan detected.
Nessus was also unable to detect the web server residing on the S7-1200 PLC. However, when we conducted a Nessus "general" scan, it returned vulnerabilities associated with SSL certificates relating to the web server (cf. Figure 4) . So while Nessus does not detect the web server for the PLC through its SCADA plugin, the general scan detects the PLC as a web server and the weak SSL certificates. In contrast, while SimaticScan detects the web server, it does not detect the SSL vulnerabilities.
SimaticScan vs. SCADA honeypot
Conpot is a configurable ICS/SCADA software honeypot that allows cybersecurity professionals and ICS owners to assess how potential threats would attack a real-world SCADA system (Conpot (2016) We ran SimaticScan against Conpot's default profile for a S7-200 PLC and made the following observations:
• SimaticScan identified two vulnerabilities: DoS attacks and default credentials in web interface.
• The software used to directly communicate with the (simulated) PLC was unavailable on the machine running SimaticScan. Therefore, session ID and plaintext vulnerabilities could not be found as traffic data between an engineering workstation and the PLC could not be established.
• TCP-hijack vulnerabilities could not be verified as the Conpot implementation is a virtual system that binds itself to the loopback (home) interface of the machine running SimaticScan. Therefore, an attempt to TCP-hijack the PLC cannot be made, as SimaticScan tries to hijack the connection originating from the Conpot servers, not the connection to the PLC.
• Read/write vulnerabilities could not be established, as the data blocks on the Conpot PLC had different values and could not be inferred due to time constraints.
The web interface vulnerability does not come as a surprise: it is a design decision to leave default credentials in Conpot's web server to entice attacks. On the other hand, the denial of service vulnerability could threaten the availability of the honeypot.
This experiment can be considered from two complementary angles:
• Evaluating how exhaustive a vulnerability scanner is with respect to established vulnerabilities, as implemented in honeypots.
• Evaluating how exhaustive and realistic a honeypot is when scanned and compared to the actual system it emulates.
As noted in the remarks above, some potential vulnerabilities could not be identified due to limitations on both sides: default configuration and lack of compatible software in Conpot, ability to capture loopback traffic or detect data blocks in SimaticScan. Such an experiment encourages a virtuous cycle, where scanner and honeypot discover each other's limitations and improve based on their mutual evaluations.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
As the level of connectivity in ICS grows, it is increasingly important to develop defensive solutions that are specialised to such settings. Our comparison of SimaticScan and Nessus demonstrates the value that can be derived from hybrid IT/OT approaches, particularly when utilised with existing general purpose systems such as Nessus.
In order to further establish the importance of such specialised systems, we undertook a SHODAN search of the three PLCs we utilised in our evaluation. We discovered 141 S7-1200, 40 S7-300 and 14 ET 200SP PLCs connected to the global internet. Any unpatched vulnerabilities and/or previously unknown vulnerabilities in these PLCs pose a significant risk. Such risks can be mitigated through identification of vulnerabilities using specialised tools such as SimaticScan.
In future work, the code of SimaticScan will be consolidated and its functionality extended. The variety of equipment available in Lancaster University's tesbed allows the study of equipment from various providers, including, for instance, Siemens, Allen Bradley, and Schneider, for which we plan to build further specialised vulnerability scanners.
